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Reinforcing National Security and Regional Stability 
The Implications cif Nuclear Weapons and Strategies 
MUTHIAH ALAGAPPA 
Another major conclusion of this study is that although nuclear weapons could 
have destabilizing consequences in certain situations, on net they have reinforced 
national security and regional stability in Asia. It is possible to argue that fledgling 
and small nuclear arsenals would be more vulnerable to preventive attacks; that 
the related strategic compulsion for early use may lead to early launch postures 
and crisis situations; that limited war under nuclear conditions to alter or restore 
the political status quo can intensify tensions and carry the risk of escalation to 
major war; that inadequate command, control, and safety measures could result 
in accidents; and that nuclear facilities and material may be vulnerable to terror-
ist attacks. These are legitimate concerns, but thus far nuclear weapons have not 
undermined national security and regional stability in Asia. Instead, they have 
ameliorated national security concerns, strengthened the status quo, increased 
deterrence dominance, prevented the outbreak of major wars, and reinforced 
the regional trend to reduce the salience of force in international politics. Nor 
have nuclear weapons had the predicted domino effect. These consequences have 
strengthened regional security and stability that rest on multiple pillars. 
The grim scenarios associated with nuclear weapons in Asia frequently rely on 
worst-case political and military situations; often they are seen in isolation from 
the national priorities of regional states that emphasize economic development 
and modernization through participation in regional and global economies and 
the high priority accorded to stability in domestic and international affairs. The 
primary goal of regional states is not aggrandizement through military aggression 
but preservation of national integrity, state or regime survival, economic growth 
and prosperity, increase in national power and international influence, preserva-
tion or incremental change in the status quo, and the construction of regional and 
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global orders in which they are subjects rather than objects. Seen in this broader 
perspective, nuclear weapons and more generally military force are of greater rel-
evance in the defense, deterrence, and assurance roles than offensive ones .. This 
does not imply that offensive use of force or military clashes will not occur; only 
that force is not the first option, that military clashes will be infrequent, and 
that when they do occur they will be limited in scope and intensity. Security 
interaction in Asia increasingly approximates behavior associated with defensive 
realism. 
The study advances four other propositions on the implications of nuclear 
weapons and strategies for security and stability in the Asian security. region and 
for the global nuclear order. First, it argues that nuclear weapons have a modify-
ing effect, but they do not fundamentally alter system structure (distribution of 
power) or the patterns of amity and enmity. By strengthening weaker powers, 
nuclear weapons have helped offset imbalances in conventional and nuclear ca-
pabilities and mitigated the negative consequences of those imbalances. This has 
affected the distribution and effects of military power in certain bilateral rela-
tionships. However, nuclear weapons in and of themselves have not substantially 
altered the overall regional distribution of power. Likewise, nuclear weapons have 
not fundamentally altered patterns of amity and enmity in the Asian security re-
gion. The one exception may be in the Middle East where a nuclear Iran could 
bring into sharper relief the Israel-Iran line of enmity and temper that between 
Israel and certain Arab states (though not the Palestinians). This is still a hypo-
thetical situation, and Israel-Iran enmity is not only a function of nuclear weap-
ons. A nuclear Iran could substantially alter the Middle East security dynamics, 
broaden and increase the connection of that region to South Asia, and increase 
the subregion's relevance for regional and global security. In all other Asian sub-
regions, nuclear weapons have not altered security patterns but have affected the 
intensity of existing security dilemmas. Offensive strategies including first use 
have intensified certain security dilemmas; deterrence strategies by and large have 
had ameliorating effects. 
Second, the impact of nuclear weapons on alliance formation and sustenance 
is mixed. In the abstract, nuclear weapons should enhance internal balancing and 
reduce the need for external balancing; this should reduce the significance of al-
liances. In certain ways this has been the case with Pakistan, Israel, and North 
Korea. All these countries see nuclear weapons as enhancing their self-reliant de-
terrence capability and as their ultimate security guarantee. However, nuclear 
weapons have not reduced the salience of alliance and alignment relationships for 
these countries. Nuclear weapon states may still choose to ally or align with each 
other for different benefits. For nonnuclear weapon states that perceive nuclear or 
large-scale conventional threats, alliance with a state that can effectively extend 
the deterrence function of its nuclear arsenal remains attractive. Concern with 
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nuclear threats, along with other considerations, has strengthened the U.S. alli-
ance relationships with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. In certain situations, 
concern with nuclear threat could also challenge and weaken these alliances. 
Third, on conflict resolution, the study posits that the enormous destructive 
power of nuclear weapons argues against dispute resolution through the physical 
use of violence. At the same time, nuclear weapons are not a barrier to peaceful 
conflict resolution. In fact, the grave risks associated with escalation to nuclear 
war have occasionally induced parties to explore a diplomatic settlement. The 
settlement of disputes, however, requires conflicting parties to negotiate compro-
mises on political differences. In the absence of such compromise, nuclear weap-
ons can freeze and intensify con:flicts. 
Finally, the study posits that if it is to continue to be relevant, the nuclear or-
der that emerged during the Cold War must substantially alter to accommodate 
contemporary strategic realities, including a focus on Asia, which has become 
a core world region and in which strategic competition is likely to intensify. A 
"new" nuclear order that is likely to emerge gradually would have to address at 
least four challenges: (I) sustaining deterrence in a condition of asymmetry and 
small nuclear forces, (2) accommodating "new" nuclear weapon states, (3) preven-
ting the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states and to nonstate actors, 
and (4) facilitating the safe and secure development of nuclear energy to meet the 
growing demand for this clean fuel. Freezing the twentieth-century order would 
be counterproductive. The gap between the formal order and reality would widen 
and undermine its viability and effectiveness. 
The findings on the roles and implications of nuclear weapons in this study 
may appear too "benign" and unacceptable to those who view nuclear weapons 
as the primary drivers of insecurity and arms control, especially nonproliferation 
scholars and advocates who see preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and 
their eventual elimination as urgent ends in themselves. Regardless of intellectual 
and moral persuasions, nuclear weapons will be a feature of the Asian security 
landscape in the foreseeable future. The ethics of responsibility requires us to 
investigate and address all their security implications, not just the negative con-
sequences of proliferation. In this connection, security studies and arms control 
scholarship in the twenty-first century should illuminate, develop, and subject the 
"new" roles and strategies for the employment of nuclear weapons to more rigor-
ous analysis and contribute to deterrence stability in a condition of asymmetric 
power relationships. Strategic dialogue among nuclear weapon states that fosters 
common understandings can also contribute to stability. 
Nuclear Weapons Reinforce Security and Stability 
Three contending views have been advanced on the consequence of nuclear 
weapons for peace and security in Europe during the Cold War. One view is 
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that nuclear weapons contributed to the long peace and stability in Europe (Gad-
dis 1992; Jervis 1988; Waltz 2004).1 The second view does not contest the idea of 
a long peace but disputes that nuclear weapons contributed to it (Mueller 1988, 
1998). The third view contests the claim that the Cold War was a period of stable 
peace. In this view, the nuclear standoff during the Cold War was highly danger-
ous and should be avoided. In terms of relevance for the contemporary era, some 
Western analysts (mostly nonproliferation scholars and advocates) argue that the 
contribution of nuclear weapons to the long peace in Europe would not apply 
to Asia. Asian countries are culturally different; their militaries view preventive 
war in a favorable light and are not interested in developing invulnei<1,ble strategic 
forces; and insecure command and control arrangements make them more prone 
to accidents and unauthorized use (Feaver 1992-93, 1993; Sagan 1994, 1995). Ad-
herents of this perspective argue that the Indian, Pakistani, and most recently 
North Korean nuclear tests would set off a domino effect, with negative conse-
quences for security and stability in Asia and the world. Their arguments connect 
with the third perspective, which argues that the Cold War nuclear confrontation 
was highly dangerous, the peace that existed was highly tenuous, Europe was 
lucky to escape the nightmare scenario, and Asia should at all cost avoid repeat-
ing that scenario. 2 The view that nuclear weapons would contribute to insecurity 
and instability in Asia seems to have become dominant in the West, especially in 
the wake of the 1999 and 2002 crisis situations between India and Pakistan and 
the 2006 North Korean nuclear test. It resonates with and reinforces earlier views 
in Europe and the United States that Asia was ripe for rivalry and that its future 
would resemble the war-torn Europe of the nineteenth century (Buzan and Segal 
1994; Friedberg 1993-94). 
In 2003 I argued against the "ripe for rivalry" line of thought, pointing out 
that Asia had enjoyed relative peace and security for over two decades (now three 
decades) and that a relatively stable security order based on several pillars had de-
veloped in the region (Alagappa 2003a, 2003b). There has not been a major war 
since the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the Chinese punitive at-
tack on Vietnam in 1979. Despite periodic tensions, war has not broken out across 
the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean peninsula. There has been more military 
conflict between India and Pakistan, and the probability of an overt military clash 
between those two countries is higher than in the other two conflicts. Even there, 
though, and in some ways because of the acquisition of nuclear weapon capabili-
ties, the use of force has been limited and largely confined to the areas adjacent 
to the line of control (LoC) in Kashmir. The 1999 Kargil conflict did not escalate 
to a full-scale war. The many territorial disputes in Asia have resulted in only oc-
casional and limited military clashes. Historical memories and contemporary con-
cerns linked to a dominant United States and a rapidly rising China have created 
mistrust, apprehensions, and long-range threat perceptions among major powers. 
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Such apprehensions and threat perceptions may intensify competition for power 
and influence, but they have not resulted in vigorous strategic rivalry and arms 
competition. Nor has Asia become a hotbed of wars where the survival of states is 
at issue and countries are constantly jockeying for power. 
International political interaction among Asian states is for the most part rule 
governed, predictable, and stable. The security order that has developed in Asia 
is largely of the instrumental type, with certain normative contractual features 
(Alagappa 2003b). It rests on several pillars. These include the consolidation of 
Asian countries as modern nation-states with rule-governed interactions, wide-
spread acceptance of the territorial and political status quo (with the exception of 
certain boundary disputes and a few survival concerns that still linger), a regional 
normative structure that ensures survival of even weak states and supports inter-
national coordination and cooperation, the high priority in Asian countries given 
to economic growth and development, the pursuit of that goal through partici-
pation in regional and global capitalist economies, the declining salience of force 
in Asian international politics, the largely status quo orientation of Asia's major 
powers, and the key role of the United States and of regional institutions in pre-
serving and enhancing security and stability in Asia. 
I extend that argument in this study to include the effects of nuclear weapons 
and the strategies for their employment. I argue that although there could be 
destabilizing consequences, on net, nuclear weapons reinforce deterrence domi-
nance and enhance national security and regional stability in the Asian security 
region. My claim is supported on the following grounds. First, nuclear weap-
ons assuage the security concerns of vulnerable states. Second, nuclear weapons 
prevent the escalation of regional conflicts to full-scale war. Third, general de-
terrence postures assure major powers and help stabilize relations among them. 
Fourth, nuclear weapons strengthen the political and military status quo by mak-
ing violent change highly dangerous and unlikely. Finally, nuclear weapons fur-
ther circumscribe and transform the role of force in Asian international politics. 
Taken together, these political and military effects of nuclear weapons, along with 
the absence of intense strategic rivalry and competition among the major pow-
ers, reinforce the security and stability that have come to characterize the Asian 
security region over the last three decades. My argument shares certain features of 
those advanced by Waltz (1995), Hagerty (1998), and Goldstein (2000), but it is also 
distinct and grounded in two decades of post-Cold War regionwide experience 
and linked to other political, strategic, and economic factors that also underpin 
security and stability in the region. It is important to view the roles and effects of 
nuclear weapons in this larger context. 
Critics would contest my claim by pointing to the crisis situations in India-
Pakistan relations during the 1999-2002 period, the abstract shortcomings of gen-
eral deterrence, and the potential domino effect of the Indian, Pakistani, and 
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North Korean nuclear test. They would also draw attention to two other sets of 
issues. One set relates to strategic considerations, including the danger of pre-
emptive and preventive action, and the strategic incentive to use a small nu,clear 
arsenal early for fear of losing it in a preemptive strike. The second set relates to 
dangers that are deemed peculiar to new nuclear weapon states: command-and-
control problems, safety issues, the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong 
hands (extremist groups and rogue regimes, which cannot be deterred because of 
their irrational behavior), and the dangers associated with nuclear weapons in a 
failed or failing state. I discuss the strategic arguments in the context of develop-
ing and supporting my argument. Here I briefly address the second set of issues. 
The risks associated with new nuclear weapon states are indeed plausible and 
should be of concern. It would take me too far afield to contest the biased assump-
tions that inform some of these claims in relation to non-Western nuclear weapon 
states. I would like to make three general points. First, the logic of risk and that 
of strategic need are different and should be addressed separately. Conflating them 
makes for a crosspurpose debate that is unproductive. The risk argument is ad-
vanced by those who oppose the acquisition and development of nuclear weapon 
capability by developing countries. Intellectual (and possibly racial) biases and 
national strategic interests are often cloaked in this argument, which is usually 
advanced on behalf of the international community. Proponents of this persua-
sion deny the security need or the relevance of nuclear weapons for that need, and 
they advance political, status, and bureaucratic arguments as the "real" reasons 
underlying the quest for a nuclear weapon capability. The country that is seek-
ing the capability advances the strategic logic. That country's political leadership 
believes that the acquisition of nuclear weapon capability is vital to secure its na-
tional interest even if it entails high cost. It is not unaware of the risks, but these 
are trumped by the security imperative. The logic of risk cannot be the basis for 
self-denial of a capability deemed vital in a self-help world. An enterprise cannot 
be forbidden, especially on discriminatory grounds, simply because it entails risks 
for the so-called international community. 
The new nuclear weapon states recognize the command, control, and safety 
problems and have taken measures to prevent accidents and theft. Outsiders should 
consider assisting those states by providing suitable technologies and best practices 
instead of simply isolating and castigating them. Safety of the nuclear arsenal in an 
unstable state, such as Pakistan, is indeed a serious concern. That concern must be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis with specific policies but not by a blanket policy 
that applies to all developing countries. Pakistan has instituted certain measures to 
safeguard its arsenal and prevent unauthorized use (see Khan and Lavoy, Chapter 7 
of this volume). Out of fear that these weapons may fall into the hands of Islamic 
extremist groups, the United States has assisted in these efforts as well (Sanger and 
Broad 2007). The strategic logic has to be addressed on its own terms by those 
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acting on behalf of the international community. The United States, for example, 
is now willing to provide security assurances to the Kim Jong 11 regime in the 
context of the Six-Party Talks to negotiate a settlement of the North Korean nu-
clear problem. In certain cases, the security need cannot be addressed satisfacto-
rily. And those acting on behalf of the international community (authorized and 
unauthorized) may have to forcibly eliminate the target state's nuclear capability 
or will have to live with a new nuclear weapon state. It has been done before. 
Second, the new states recognize the revolutionary nature of nuclear weapons; 
they are not immune to the strategic logic of these weapons. They have not be-
haved differently from the "rational" Western states. Just like the United States, 
Russia, Britain, and France, "new" countries see nuclear weapons as being use-
ful in a deterrence role. They are in the process of developing more survivable 
forces but doing it responsibly in the context of other national priorities, avoid-
ing intense arms competition that characterized the interaction of the advanced 
countries during the Cold War. Some new nuclear weapon states have attempted 
offensive strategies in the employment of nuclear weapons, but this attempt is not 
peculiar to them. The United States is in the forefront in developing offensive and 
strategic defense capabilities that some Asian states consider destabilizing. 
Third, the claim that so-called rogue states cannot be deterred does not with-
stand scrutiny. The Soviet Union was a revolutionary state seeking to fundamen-
tally transform the international order. Yet deterrence was the primary nuclear 
strategy in dealing with that country. Deterrence was also the strategy against a 
China that under Mao was deemed a rogue and irrational state, especially during 
the Cultural Revolution. Characterization of China as a revolutionary state also 
did not stop the United States from negotiating with Mao and forming a strategic 
alignment with that country against the Soviet Union. Despite the claim that 
rogue states cannot be deterred, deterrence (conventional and nuclear) has been 
and continues to be the primary U.S. strategy against North Korea. The United 
States is now negotiating with a regime that it labels as irrational and tyranni-
cal in an effort to freeze and eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapon capability. 
Certain frustrated arms controllers in the United States now attempt to depict 
India, the world's largest democracy and the fourth or fifth largest economy in 
terms of purchasing power parity, as a rogue state, although the Bush adminis-
tration through its bilateral deal with India is seeking to bring that country into 
the formal nuclear order. The ongoing debate in Asia over the pros and cons of 
a first-use policy is not much different from that in the Atlantic alliance during 
the Cold War or that in post-Cold War Russia. The point here is that the nuclear 
behavior of non-Western states is not substantively different from that of Western 
ones. Further, a country like the United States, which has a formidable nuclear 
arsenal, can deter them. I now turn to supporting my claim that nuclear weapons 
have contributed to security and stability in Asia. 
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Assuage Security Concerns 
Nuclear weapons contribute to stability by assuaging the security co~erns of 
vulnerable states. This is most evident in the case of Pakistan. Islamabad sees nu-
clear weapons as having enhanced its security in relation to the existential threat 
it perceives from India (see Khan and Lavoy, Chapter 7 of this volume). Nuclear 
weapons neutralize the effects of the large imbalance in conventional military ca-
pability, constrain India's military options, and increase Pakistan's deterrence self-
reliance. The security effect of an opaque nuclear force like that of Israel is more 
difficult to demonstrate, especially as that country also has superiOJ; conventional 
military capability. Avner Cohen suggests that Israel has been able to "extract the 
benefits of an existential nuclear deterrence posture" (see Cohen, Chapter 8 of this 
volume). Arab countries' tacit acceptance oflsrael's nuclear deterrence posture, he 
argues, has contributed to Israel's security and to regional stability by lowering 
the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in some instances even contributed 
to peace settlements, like that between Israel and Egypt. Cohen posits that Israel's 
nuclear capability possibly compelled Saddam Hussein to limit his missile attacks 
on Israel during the First Gulf War to conventional weapons. Although Israel has 
superior conventional military capability, nuclear weapons enhance Israel's self-
confidence and demonstrate its resolve to survive. 
For North Korea, nuclear weapons serve a more immediate deterrence func-
tion against the United States. Though still numerically large, North Korea's 
conventional military capability has steadily eroded and is losing the balance-of-
power advantage it had enjoyed for decades. North Korea has also lost the mili-
tary support of Russia and China. In this context, North Korea's nuclear weapon 
capability assumes greater importance. Pyongyang believes that nuclear weapons 
enhance its security and provide it with diplomatic leverage in the Six-Party Talks 
for securing tangible security, diplomatic, and economic benefits (see Park and 
Lee, Chapter 9 of this volume). It is a fact that U.S. policy has shifted from a rigid 
stance that stressed the preventive force option and demanded complete and veri-
fiable disarmament of the North Korean nuclear weapon program to serious en-
gagement in multilateral discussions to arrive at a diplomatic settlement with due 
regard to Pyongyang's concerns. Several considerations underlie the shift in U.S. 
policy. North Korea's determination to stay the course, culminating in the 2006 
nuclear test, appears to be one of them. Of particular relevance is the impact of 
Pyongyang's missile and nuclear tests on America's East Asian allies and the ensu-
ing imperative to limit the fallout from those tests. 
The U.S. extended deterrence commitments have been a significant factor in 
assuaging the security vulnerabilities and concerns of Japan and South Korea in 
the wake of the North Korean nuclear test. As discussed in Chapter I7, both coun-
tries insisted on reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment, and Japan is exploring 
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measures to increase the credibility of that commitment. In reassuring Japan, the 
U.S. commitment is a significant factor along with others in forestalling explora-
tion of an independent nuclear option by that country. For South Korea, the U.S. 
commitment enables it to maintain a nonnuclear posture, provides time to build 
a self-reliant defense capability, and is a fallback in dealing with a nuclear-armed 
North Korea. 
Help Stabilize Regional Conflicts 
Nuclear weapons contribute to regional stability by preventing the outbreak 
of major hostilities and their es~,:alation to full-scale war in key regional conflicts 
across the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean peninsula, and over Kashmir. The re-
straining effect of nuclear weapons in the Taiwan and Korean conflicts has been 
discussed in Chapter 17. The fear of escalation to the nuclear level limits China's 
force options and implicitly deters a major Chinese attack on Taiwan. The United 
States' response to Chinese threats and intimidations has been calibrated to show 
firmness and caution. Washington has also reined in provocative behavior by 
independence-oriented Taiwanese leaders. Similarly nuclear weapons help stabi-
lize the conflict on the Korean peninsula. North Korea feels more assured of its 
deterrence capability while South Korea is assured by the U.S. extended deter-
rence commitment. It is possible to argue that there has not been a deep crisis in 
the conflict across the Taiwan Strait to demonstrate the restraining and stabilizing 
effect of nuclear weapons and, further, that stability in the Taiwan and North 
Korea conflicts is due to a number of factors including conventional deterrence. 
It is difficult to refute these claims, as the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons 
cannot be isolated and quantified in the absence of severe crisis when the role and 
effect of such weapons come into sharper relief However, this does not imply ir-
relevance or that nuclear weapons do not contribute to stability. 
The stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons may be better illustrated in India-
Pakistan relations, as the crises between these two countries during the 1999-
2002 period are often cited as demonstrating nuclear weapon-induced instability. 
Rather than simply attribute these crises to the possession of nuclear weapons, 
a more accurate and useful reading would ground them in Pakistan's deliberate 
policy to alter the status quo through military means on the premise that the risk 
of escalation to nuclear war would deter India from responding with full-sc'ale 
conventional retaliation; and in India's response, employing compellence and co-
ercive diplomacy strategies. In other words, particular goals and strategies rather 
than nuclear weapons per se precipitated the crises. Further, the outcomes of these 
two crises revealed the limited utility of nuclear weapons in bringing about even 
a minor change in the territorial status quo and highlighted the grave risks associ-
ated with offensive strategies. Recognition of these limits and the grave conse-
quences in part contributed to the two countries' subsequent efforts to engage in a 
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comprehensive dialogue to settle the many disputes between them. The crises also 
led to bilateral understandings and measures to avoid unintended hostilities. 
Though it is too soon to take a long view, it is possible to argue th~t, like 
the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the 1999 and 2001-02 crises between India and 
Pakistan mark a watershed in their strategic relations: the danger of nuclear war 
shifted their focus to avoiding a major war and to finding a negotiated settlement 
to bilateral problems. Large military deployments along the common border and 
Pakistan-supported insurgent activities in India continue; and the two countries 
regularly conduct large-scale military exercises and test nuclear-capable missiles 
that have each other's entire territory within range. Despite these activities, the 
situation has become less tense; stability with the ability to absorb shocks has be-
gun to characterize the bilateral relationship over the past five years. Some have 
termed this "ugly stability" (Tellis 1997: 5), but it is stability nevertheless. 
Assurance and Stability in Major Power Relations 
The caution induced by nuclear weapons, their leveling effect, the strategic 
insurance they provide to cope with unanticipated contingencies, and general 
deterrence postures inform and circumscribe interaction among the major pow-
ers, reduce their anxieties, and constrain the role of force in their interaction. This 
enables major powers to take a long view and focus on other national priorities. 
Nuclear weapons feature primarily in deterrence and insurance roles. These roles 
are not necessarily threatening to other parties. Modernization of nuclear arsenals 
and the development of additional capabilities have proceeded at a moderate pace; 
they have produced responses but not intense strategic competition. The net effect 
has been stabilizing. 
The stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons in the Sino-American, Russo-
American, and Sino-Indian dyads were discussed in Chapter 17. Here I will limit 
myself to making some additional points. Continuing deterrence dominance 
underlies China's measured response to the U.S. emphasis on offensive strategies 
and its development of strategic missile defense. Perceiving these as undermin-
ing the robustness of its strategic deterrent force, China seeks to strengthen the 
survivability of its retaliatory force and is attempting to develop capabilities that 
would threaten American space-based surveillance and communications facilities 
in the event of hostilities. However, these efforts are not presented as a direct chal-
lenge to or competition with the United States. Beijing has deliberately sought to 
downplay the modernization of its nuclear force. This is not simply deception, 
but a serious effort to develop a strong deterrent force without entering into a 
strategic competition with the United States, which it cannot win due to the huge 
imbalance in military capabilities and technological limitations. Strategic compe-
tition will also divert attention and resources away from the more urgent mod-
ernization goals. A strong Chinese strategic deterrent force blunts the military 
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advantage of the United States, induces caution in that country, and constrains its 
military option in the event of hostilities. Although Russia's response to the U.S. 
development of offensive and strategic defense capabilities has been more vocal, it 
lacks specifics. Moscow also does not appear to have allocated significantly more 
resources to its nuclear force. 
India's strategic deterrence force does not compare with China's, but its nu-
clear, missile, and conventional military capability give New Delhi a relatively 
high degree of self-confidence in managing relations with Beijing. The insurance 
provided by its small nuclear force and strong conventional capability, combined 
with technological and resource limitations, and improving bilateral relations, ex-
plain India's gradual developm~nt of a nuclear deterrent capability against China. 
India's minimum deterrence nuclear posture and its gradual nuclear buildup also 
reassure China, which sees the United States as its principal security concern. In 
recent times, Japan has been more sensitive than India to China's nuclear force 
modernization and the development of North Korea's missile and nuclear capa-
bilities. In part, this is due to the lack of its own nuclear weapon capability. How-
ever, Japan has not sought its own nuclear weapon capability to compete with 
China or North Korea, a move that could be destabilizing. Instead it has sought 
reaffirmation of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment, denuclearization of 
the Korean peninsula, increase in its own conventional military capability, and 
development of strategic defense, all of which can be stabilizing. 
Because they are not immediately threatening, the general deterrence postures 
adopted by all the major powers have contributed to regional stability as well. 
Patrick Morgan (2003: 80-II5) has written that government leaders are "often 
barely moved by general deterrence threats that they ought to take into account." 
Because the response to it is uncertain, he argues that general deterrence suffers an 
inherent credibility problem and is vulnerable to military probes that could lead 
to deterrence failure. It is possible to depict the Chinese missile firings in 1995-96 
and the 1999 Pakistani military infiltration into Kargil as probing the general de-
terrence postures of the United States and India, respectively. The firm and quick 
response in both cases established the credibility of American commitment to the 
status quo across the Taiwan Strait and the Indian determination to preserve the 
status quo in Kashmir. When established, immediate deterrence (as opposed to 
general deterrence, although the difference between the two is not clear-cut) may 
be more credible, but this is not certain. But immediate deterrence may not be 
relevant or practical in all situations. In the absence of intense hostilities or a lack 
of capabilities, a nuclear weapon state is more likely to adopt a policy of general 
deterrence. The risk of escalation to nuclear war and the devastation that can be 
inflicted by nuclear weapons make general deterrence more effective than con-
ventional deterrence. Periodic demonstration of resolve may be necessary to shore 
up the credibility of general deterrence. From the perspective of stability, which 
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is the primary issue addressed here, general deterrence is less directly threatening 
than immediate deterrence and more effective than conventional deterrence. It 
does not aggravate security relations or feed competitive strategic armament; and 
it is more defensive in character than immediate deterrence, which can have a 
strong aggressive component. All these features of general deterrence contribute 
to stability. 
Reinforce the Political and Military Status Quo 
Reviewing the Cold War experience, Robert Jervis has argued that nuclear 
weapons strengthen the status quo. However, he qualified that assertion by ex-
cluding situations where the status quo is ambiguous or when a revisionist power 
has the power to implement threats, has high resolve, and sees the domestic and 
international situations as precarious enough to merit great risk and cost (Jervis 
1989: 32-34). Along these lines but in a more detailed fashion, Paul Kapur (2006) 
argues that nuclear weapons may provide incentives for a weaker, revisionist state 
to engage in limited conventional military action to alter the status quo. Such a 
state would not engage in aggressive behavior in a conventional world because it 
would most likely result in failure. In a nuclear world, the stronger state is inhib-
ited from employing its full military might for fear that hostilities would escalate 
to nuclear war. This risk of escalation emboldens a highly motivated state to be-
have aggressively. 
In this study, I argue that the risk of escalation cuts both ways and that the net 
effect of nuclear weapons has been to reinforce the status quo and enhance stabil-
ity in the Asian security region in two ways: they make change through violence 
more difficult and highly costly; and they dramatically increase the political cost of 
"adventurist" behavior by nuclear weapon states. The limit to forcefully alter the 
status quo and the associated political risks disadvantage the challenger and help en-
trench the status quo. These points are best illustrated by the India-Pakistan case. 
They are also evident in a limited manner in the conflict across the Taiwan Strait. 
I begin with the basic observation that the attempts by Pakistan to alter the 
territorial status quo in Kashmir and by China to force a particular political out-
come in Taiwan through the threat and use of force failed. Jervis's qualification of 
his argument and Kapur's extension of that argument may explain why Pakistan 
resorted to military action in 1999, but cannot account for the failure and impli-
cations of that action. To begin with, the relatively small-scale Pakistani military 
infiltration, even if successful, could not have substantially altered the territorial 
status quo in Kashmir, although it could have set a precedent for further "salami 
tactics." In the end, it did not bring about even a minor change in the territo-
rial status quo. On the contrary, the outcome of the military action helped en-
trench the territorial status quo. India responded firmly to the military intrusion. 
It defeated and compelled the withdrawal of the Pakistani infiltration force. After 
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initial denials, Pakistan acknowledged that regular troops undertook the mili-
tary intrusion and eventually had to withdraw that force. The risk of escalation 
cut both ways. It constrained India's military options, but it also circumscribed 
Pakistan's response to the Indian military reaction. Pakistan could not openly 
support its forces in Indian-held Kashmir or escalate the war. By strictly limiting 
its military response to territory under its control, India gave credence to and le-
gitimated the LoC. And since the conflict, New Delhi has insisted that although it 
is open to new thinking on the Kashmir issue, it would not condone altering the 
LoC. International support for this position has since increased. 
India emerged from the conflict as a responsible status quo power, whereas 
Pakistan's "adventurist" behavior 'further tarnished its shaky international image. 
The rise of Islamic extremism in Pakistan, Islamabad's support for the Taliban 
regime when that regime was in power in Afghanistan, the wide and substantial 
damage done by the A. Q. Khan network, military authoritarianism, and political 
instability, among others, had raised concerns about Pakistan as a viable state and 
a responsible nuclear weapon state. The 1999 adventure added to these concerns. 
The inability to bring about even a minor change in the territorial status quo and 
the grave risks associated with a limited conflict under nuclear conditions appear 
to have led to a sober assessment of the role of nuclear weapons in this dyad. The 
net effect of nuclear weapons has been to enhance deterrence dominance and en-
trench the political and territorial status quo. 
The Taiwan case is less instructive as the role of nuclear weapons is implicit, 
and there has not been a severe crisis. Further, China was not trying to alter the 
territorial status quo through force but to influence the political situation on the 
island in a desired direction. Seeking to affect the outcome of the Taiwan presi-
dential elections in 1995, China fired missiles in the vicinity of the island. That 
effort failed. Not only did the result of the election go against the outcome de-
sired by Beijing, the United States responded in a firm manner by deploying two 
aircraft carriers and warning China that it would not tolerate intimidation and 
forceful change in Taiwan's status. China refrained from escalating the military 
conflict out of concern that it could not achieve conflict escalation dominance and 
that escalation would risk bringing nuclear weapons more directly into the con-
flict. Although China has not renounced the use of force and continues to build 
up its missile and amphibious capabilities, that crisis highlighted the dangers and 
drawbacks of relying on the force option (including the negative consequences for 
its image as a responsible rising power), leading Beijing to deemphasize forceful 
unification. That incident as well as the public discussion in China of the merits 
of its no-first-use (NFU) policy and the advocacy in certain Chinese quarters for 
using nuclear weapons in a war-fighting role in the event of a military conflict 
across the Taiwan Strait has also chastened the United States. Since the 1995-96 
crisis, the emphasis in both China and the United States has been on preserving 
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the status quo. Reversing its earlier strong support, the Bush administration leaned 
heavily on the Chen administration in Taiwan not to take any unilateral action 
that would alter the status quo. In the India-Pakistan case and in the conflict 
across the Taiwan Strait, nuclear weapons have further reduced the prospects for 
military victory and strengthened the status quo and stability. 
The Domino Effect Has Not Materialized 
It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability 
arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the domino effect of 
new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventive action against' new nu-
clear weapon states, and the compulsion of these states to use their small arsenals 
early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger 
nuclear adversary. 
On the domino effect, India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapon programs have 
not fueled new programs in South Asia or beyond. Iran's quest for nuclear weap-
ons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is grounded in that 
country's security concerns about the United States and Tehran's regional aspi-
rations. The North Korean test has evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. 
Tokyo is certainly concerned; its reaction, though, has not been to initiate its own 
nuclear weapon program but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended 
deterrence commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S.-Japan security treaty were to 
weaken, it is not certain that Japan would embark on a nuclear weapon program. 
Likewise, South Korea has sought reaffirmation of the American extended deter-
rence commitment, but has firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without dra-
matic change in its political, economic, and security circumstances, South Korea 
is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear weapon program as it 
did in the 1970s. South Korea could still become a nuclear weapon state by inher-
iting the nuclear weapons of North Korea should the KimJong II regime collapse. 
Whether it retains or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circum-
stances of a unified Korea. The North Korean nuclear test has not spurred Taiwan 
or Mongolia to develop nuclear weapon capability. 
The point is that each country's decision to embark on and sustain nuclear 
weapon programs is contingent on its particular security and other circumstances. 
Though appealing, the domino theory is not predictive; often it is employed to 
justify policy on the basis of alarmist predictions. The loss of South Vietnam, for 
example, did not lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia. In fact the 
so-called dominos became drivers of a vibrant Southeast Asia and brought about 
a fundamental transformation in that subregion (Lord 1993, 1996). In the nuclear 
arena, the nuclear programs of China, India, and Pakistan were part of a security 
chain reaction, not mechanically falling dominos. However, as observed earlier 
the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear tests have thus far not had the 
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domino effect predicted by alarmist analysts and policy makers. Great caution 
should be exercised in accepting at face value the sensational predictions of indi-
viduals who have a vested interest in accentuating the dangers of nuclear prolif-
eration. Such analysts are now focused on the dangers of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear 
Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on 
the basis of an objective reading of the drivers of national and regional security in 
Iran and the Middle East. 
Declining Probability of Preventive Military Action 
in East and South Asia 
The prospect of military action to destroy nuclear weapons and facilities in 
East and South Asia has declined markedly. The Soviet Union contemplated pre-
ventive military action against China's nuclear facilities in 1969, but the United 
States refused to support such action. Several years ago there was concern that 
India might attack Pakistan's nuclear installations. Even if this was a serious pos-
sibility, its probability has declined sharply. The two countries entered into an 
agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. This agreement held even 
during the crisis situations in the 1999-2002 period. Since then, India and Paki-
stan have taken additional measures to prevent an accidental outbreak or escala-
tion of conflict. 
More germane to the contemporary context is the emphasis in the U.S. 2002 
Nuclear Posture Review on offensive military action against rogue states. The 
United States seriously contemplated a preventive strike against North Korea's 
nuclear weapon facilities during the first nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula 
in 1993-94 (Perry 2006). And the George W. Bush administration threatened 
preventive action against North Korea during its first term. 3 However, that policy 
has lost traction and has no support among states in Northeast Asia, including U.S. 
allies. Neighboring countries oppose any preventive strike, fearing that it could 
result in a general war that would have negative consequences for their own na-
tional security and regional stability. Although the United States has the military 
capability to undertake such an action it is unlikely to act without the support of 
its regional allies. The force option is still on the table, but the approach to resolve 
the North Korean nuclear problem has decidedly shifted to the diplomatic arena. 
In contrast, preventive military action against presumed nuclear facilities has 
been more common in the Middle East. Israel undertook a preventive strike 
on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 on the 
grounds that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction. It is 
now con fumed that on September 6, 2007, Israel attacked an alleged nuclear facil-
ity in Syria supposedly supplied by North Korea. In addition to warning Syria, 
there is speculation that this strike was intended as a message for North Korea 
and Iran. For some time now, there has been speculation that the United States 
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or Israel might carry out preventive military action against Iran. In recent times 
the fear of a nuclear Iran has been compounded by presumed Iranian interference 
in Iraq, the implosion of that country, and the perceived development of an !ran-
centered alignment in the Middle East that would be detrimental to the interests 
of the United States, its Arab allies, and IsraeL Speculation that the United States 
is contemplating a military strike on Iran waxes and wanes, with Tehran warning 
of severe consequences for the United States and Israel. 
Certainly the United States and Israel have the military capability to carry out 
a preventive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities (Logan 2006; Raas and Long 2007). 
However, such action would have to cross several hurdles and success 1$ uncertain. 
Iran's nuclear complex is large, carefully concealed, and spread throughout the 
country. The availability of accurate intelligence and the political repercussions of 
such an attack are primary limiting factors. The ongoing wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq are limiting factors as well. A directed military strike against critical nuclear 
facilities might not strain American military capability, but a full-scale invasion 
oflran to bring about regime change would. The political, diplomatic, economic, 
and military costs of such a war would be high for the United States. Although 
support for preventive action appears to have increased among certain Western 
allies, and the Arab allies of the United States might not object, there would be 
little international support in other regions or domestic support in the United 
States. Even if it does not carry out a military strike, Washington might not object 
to an Israeli preventive action. It has been reported that Tel Aviv and Washington 
shared intelligence before the Israeli strike against the Syrian facility. From the 
preceding discussion it appears that preventive military strikes are still a possibility 
in the Middle East. Compared to the rest of Asia, there are far fewer checks and 
balances in the Middle East. Offensive use of force continues to be important in 
that subregion. 
Incentive for Early Use and Instability: 
Not an Empirical Reality 
It has been argued that states with small or nascent nuclear arsenals might have 
strategic incentive to use them early in a conflict to secure a military advantage in 
an impending full-scale war or to prevent the crippling of their nuclear arsenals in 
the event of a preventive strike. Without survivable nuclear forces, these consid-
erations would encourage launch-on-warning postures that could produce crisis 
situations and undermine stability. Park and Lee (Chapter 9 of this volume) dis-
cuss this theme in relation to North Korea. Although uncertain how this theoreti-
cal possibility might materialize, they posit that North Korea's nuclear armaments 
will generate continuous crises and threats to peace on the Korean peninsula. That 
North Korea's quest for nuclear weapons and the American responses have gener-
ated crisis situations and may do so in the future is not the issue. The question 
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is whether nascent and small nuclear weapon states will adopt early-launch pos-
tures that produce crisis and undermine stability. There is little empirical evi-
dence to support such a claim. 
In the abstract, it would be illogical for a nascent or small nuclear power to 
adopt such a posture against a much superior adversary, as for example in the 
standoffbetween North Korea and the United States. Even if North Korea were 
to inflict substantial damage on the United States or its allies, it is unclear what 
coercive value would accrue to it. It is almost certain, though, that it would not 
survive a massive retaliatory strike by the United States. An early use posture can 
only be rationalized on the ba,sis of an irrational regime, as has been the case with 
North Korea. However, if North Korea develops a partially survivable nuclear 
force, early use could have some value; but still such use is likely to be deterred by 
the possibility of massive retaliation and destruction by the more powerful adver-
sary. Early use postures may make more sense between powers of roughly equal 
capability with partially survivable nuclear forces. However, evidence from the 
India-Pakistan dyad, which has a relatively longer nuclear history, does not sup-
port this abstract possibility. Despite Pakistan's refusal to embrace an NFU policy 
and its attempt to exploit the risk of escalation to nuclear war, Islamabad has not 
opted for an early use posture (see Khan and Lavoy, Chapter 7 of this volume). 
India, which is committed to an NFU policy, has also not adopted an early use 
posture. As Devin Hagerty (1998) points out, despite the tensions between them, 
both countries have taken unilateral and bilateral measures to avoid early use. De-
terrence, not early use, characterizes their nuclear postures. 
Evidence from Asia offers little support for the instability arguments. On the 
contrary, the claim that nuclear weapons have thus far contributed to security and 
stability rests on a relatively stronger empirical foundation. Stability has also been 
enhanced by the further circumscription due to nuclear weapons of the role of 
force in Asian international politics. 
Reinforcing the Circumscription tf Force 
In 2003, I argued that the role of force in Asian international politics was be-
coming circumscribed (Alagappa 2003b). I attributed the declining salience of 
force to several developments: the general acceptance in Asia of the prevailing 
political and territorial status quo, which makes conquest and domination un-
acceptable and reduces the need for a forceful defense of a state's core interests; 
an increase in the political, diplomatic, and economic cost of using force in a 
situation of complex interdependence; and the impracticality of resolving con-
flicts through force. These considerations reduce the need for the offensive role of 
force, leaving defense, deterrence, and assurance as the primary missions of armed 
forces in the region. Over the past three decades, the use of force has been limited 
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to border clashes, militant insurgencies, and occasional clashes at sea, where the 
danger of escalation is low. A major war could still occur, but the probability has 
declined dramatically since the early phase of the Cold War, when Asia was the 
site of several large-scale wars. 
Nuclear weapons reinforce the declining salience of the offensive role of force 
in the Asian security region and increase the importance of deterrence, defense, and 
assurance. The logic of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons and the 
lack of defense against them also applies to Asia. None of the key regional conflicts 
can be resolved through the use offorce, including conventional military force. The 
danger of escalation limits the offensive role of conventional military force among 
nuclear weapon states. The salience of deterrence and defense, already on the rise 
in the context of wide acceptance of the status quo, is now becoming entrenched. 
Asian states are becoming defensive realists. Nuclear weapons make nuclear deter-
rence and conventional defense the dominant strategies. Despite the U.S. effort to 
build a strategic defense system, deterrence dominance, for reasons advanced in 
earlier discussion, is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Target nuclear 
weapon states can and will take measures to increase the robustness of their stra-
tegic deterrent forces. In situations of stark asymmetry, limited strategic defense 
may make a difference and make offensive use of force under nuclear conditions 
more attractive. However, it is unlikely to eliminate all uncertainty; continued 
caution is likely counsel against offensive military action. 
Fear of escalation to the nuclear level and the desire to be viewed as a responsible 
player by the international community appear to have constrained India's military 
options in 1999. A similar fear constrains Chinese and American options across 
the Taiwan Strait, and American options on the Korean peninsula. The military, 
political, diplomatic, and economic costs of using force, especially nuclear force, is 
very high among nuclear weapon states. Nuclear weapons strengthen the growing 
trend in the region that emphasizes conventional defense, nuclear deterrence, and 
political assurance. 
Modifying Effect on System Structure and Dynamics 
Nuclear weapons have not fundamentally altered system structure, which is 
defined by the overall distribution of power (that depends on several attributes, 
including but not only military power) in the system. Nor have they altered the 
patterns of amity and enmity in the Asian security region, which are a function 
of threat perceptions rooted in political disputes, competition for international 
position and influence, historical animosities, and other factors. However, nuclear 
weapons have strengthened weaker powers and in certain situations have intensi-
fied or ameliorated the intensity of threat perception. These consequences have 
had a leveling effect and affected security dynamics in certain relationships. 
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Strengthening Weaker Powers 
Nuclear weapons strengthen weaker powers by canceling or mrtlgating the 
effects of imbalance in conventional and nuclear weapon capability and thereby 
reducing their strategic vulnerability. By threatening nuclear retaliation and cata-
strophic damage in the event oflarge-scale conventional or nuclear attack, and ex-
ploiting the risk of escalation to nuclear war, weaker powers with nuclear weapons 
constrain the military options of a stronger adversary. This is most evident in the 
India-Pakistan dyad but also in the China-U.S. and North Korea-U.S. dyads. 
Pakistan is much weaker tttan India in several dimensions of national power, 
including conventional military capability. It suffered defeats in two of the three 
conventional wars it fought with India in the prenuclear era, with the 1971 war 
resulting in humiliating defeat and dismemberment. In the nuclear era, which 
dates from the late 1980s, Islamabad has been able to deter India from crossing 
into Pakistan proper and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir even in the context of Pak-
istani military infiltration into Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1999. India did not 
follow through with the limited-war option in 2001-02 because of the grave risk 
it entailed. India was also forced in part by the risk of nuclear war to engage in 
a comprehensive dialogue to settle disputes between the two countries, includ-
ing the Kashmir conflict. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal has blunted the potency of 
India's large conventional military force. Although it has not canceled out all the 
consequences of the large power differential between the two countries, it has 
had significant constraining impact with carry-on effects for subregional security 
structure and dynamics. 
China viewed nuclear weapons as a cheap and effective way of counterbalanc-
ing the United States and the Soviet Union during different phases of the Cold 
War (Goldstein 2000). Despite its rapid rise, Beijing still views its relatively small 
nuclear arsenal as a key means of redressing the huge imbalance in military ca-
pability with the United States. A small but modernizing nuclear arsenal has en-
abled it to limit the coercive consequences of the strategic imbalance and restrain 
American military intervention in the conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Further, 
by mitigating the effects of military imbalance, a growing China has been able 
to exploit its other stronger attributes to enhance its power and influence in Asia. 
Like China vis-a-vis the United States, India sees it nuclear arsenal as necessary to 
reduce its strategic vulnerability in relation to China. A much weaker Russia now 
seeks to compensate for its weakness in conventional military power with its still 
formidable nuclear arsenal. 
The leveling and cautionary effects of nuclear weapons are also evident in the 
relationship of the weak and isolated North Korea with the vastly superior United 
States. Although North Korea does not have an operational nuclear arsenal and 
the United States can destroy that country many times over, the risk of quick 
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and substantial damage to its forces and allies in the region induces caution and 
constrains U.S. military options. If in the future North Korea develops nuclear 
weapons and marries them to its missile capability, the risks associated with pre-
ventive military action against that country would multiply. Instead of simply suf-
fering the will of the mighty United States, North Korea's nascent capability has 
provided it with security and bargaining leverage in its negotiations with major 
powers in the region. 
Modifying Effect on System Structure 
The greater potential for internal balancing and the leveling effect of nuclear 
weapons modify system structure and its effects. In South Asia, for example, hav-
ing nuclear weapons has enabled Pakistan to militarily counterbalance India and 
make Indian dominance of that subregion more difficult. Although Pakistan has 
all along balanced India, conventional balancing became more difficult after the 
dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 and the highly contingent nature of exter-
nal support. Nuclear weapons enable Pakistan to counterbalance and constrain 
India's military options in a more sustained manner, relying on its own capabil-
ity. Likewise, the Chinese nuclear capability has a modifying effect on American 
dominance. The hegemonic position and influence of the United States in Asia is 
increasingly constrained by China; nuclear weapons indirectly contribute to this. 
At the same time, nuclear weapons in themselves have not fundamentally al-
tered system structure in the Asian security region. The unipolar structure of the 
present system and the anticipated changes in the distribution of power among 
states in the Asian security region are consequences of change in the overall na-
tional power of states that has several dimensions. Military power is an important 
component of national power; and, as indicated earlier, having nuclear weapons 
makes a significant difference in national military capability. However, military 
power by itself is not a sufficient basis for major power status. Further, without 
strong political, economic, technological, and demographic foundations, it is dif-
ficult to sustain a strong military capability, as demonstrated by the experience of 
the former Soviet Union. The enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons 
is important for its modifying effect, but it is less fungible and less relevant in the 
pursuit of nonsecurity goals. Nuclear weapons add to but are not a sufficient basis 
of national power. 
The present dominance of the United States, the decline in the position of 
Russia, and the rise of China and India are not due to their nuclear weapon ca-
pabilities. U.S. dominance is grounded in its vast lead in several dimensions of 
power. Although Russia still has a formidable nuclear arsenal, it is not a super-
power or even a top-tier regional power in Asia. In fact, the rapid decline of the 
Soviet Union/Russia from superpower status was due to the fact that it was a 
one-dimensional (military) power. That lesson has not been lost on China, which 
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seeks to develop comprehensive national power (Wu I998). China has long had 
nuclear weapons and is slowly modernizing its nuclear arsenal. The rapid and sub-
stantial increase in its national power and the apprehension it creates are primarily 
due to China's sustained high rate of economic growth, which in turn produces 
the resources for accumulating and exercising international power and influence. 
Likewise, the rise in the power and status of India is due in large measure to its 
economic growth and change in foreign policy. Nuclear weapons contribute to 
but do not account for India's rise. Political stability, economic growth, techno-
logical advancement, and human resource potential and development, along with 
military capability, contribute to international perception and ranking of states. 
I disagree with those who discount or sideline the salience of nuclear weap-
ons in the power and prestige of countries in the contemporary era (Paul I998), 
but at the same time it is necessary to locate the importance of nuclear weapons 
in proper perspective. Military power remains an important component of na-
tional power. To be taken seriously as a major power with a voice in international 
security matters, a country must possess substantial military capability. This is 
reflected in the defense expenditures and policies of all major states and in the 
quest of Japan to become a "normal" power. Although it has been an economic 
superpower for more than two decades and has made substantial financial con-
tributions to the peace and security efforts of the United Nations and those of its 
alliance partner, the United States, Japan has been unable to gain the international 
status and recognition it desires. It now seeks to develop its conventional military 
capability so that it can contribute "blood" and not just "treasure" in meeting its 
international obligations and security treaty commitments and to play a more as-
sertive role in shaping the emerging international security order in Asia and more 
broadly the world. Although Japan does not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, it 
would like to institute measures to increase the effectiveness and credibility of the 
American extended deterrence commitment to Japan. If the U.S. commitment 
erodes, it is not improbable though not certain that Japan may develop its own 
nuclear weapon capability. 
Exacerbating Some Security Concerns but Not Others 
Nuclear weapons have not fundamentally altered lines of amity and enmity in 
the Asian security region. The principal effect of nuclear weapons has been their 
consequence for the intensity of existing animosities, not the creation of new ones 
except possibly in the Middle East, where a nuclear Iran could substantially alter 
the subregional lines of enmity. Offensive strategies for the employment of nu-
clear weapons have intensif1ed existing security dilemmas; but deterrence strate-
gies have not. 
Enmity in the India-Pakistan dyad dates to the partition of British India and 
their conflict over Kashmir and Pakistan's quest for equality with India. Nuclear 
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weapons have both ameliorated and intensified threat perceptions in this dyad. 
They have mitigated Pakistan's sense of insecurity by constraining India's mili-
tary options. The large asymmetry in conventional military capability has become 
less consequential. Nuclear weapons, including Pakistan's first-use strategy, have 
strengthened deterrence in this relationship. However, Pakistan's policy to exploit 
the risk of escalation to nuclear war to alter the political and territorial status quo 
in Kashmir, and India's coercive response to restore the status quo and to demand 
cessation of Pakistani support for crossborder insurgent movements, intensified 
both countries' vulnerabilities and threat perceptions, and resulted in crisis situ-
ations early in the overt nuclear era. Since then, however, the situtttion has stabi-
lized. A mixed strategic picture (conflict, dialogue, and negotiations between the 
two countries, along with other priorities and international pressure) has helped to 
reduce the threat intensity between them. Recognition of the grave risks associ-
ated with offensive strategies under nuclear conditions is a factor as well. Although 
both countries continue to develop their nuclear and missile capabilities with ref-
erence to each other, the anxiety surrounding missile tests and military exercises 
has declined. Further, the crises precipitated by offensive strategies deepened the 
security interdependence between the two countries, providing a basis for limited 
confidence building and arms control measures to prevent unintended escalation 
of hostilities. 
North Korea's quest for nuclear weapons heightened existing security con-
cerns in the United States, Japan, and South Korea, all of which were already 
in adversarial relationships with that country. U.S. threats of preventive action 
intensified North Korea's threat perception, providing additional rationale and 
momentum to its nuclear quest. The net effect has been to intensify threat per-
ceptions in the U.S.-North Korea and North Korea-Japan dyads and to a lesser 
degree in the North Korea-South Korea dyad. This has contributed to strength-
ening the security ties between the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia. 
For different reasons, China too became concerned about North Korea's nuclear 
program. That program, and particularly the 2006 North Korean nuclear test, 
heightened Chinese sensitivity to the negative consequences for security and sta-
bility in Northeast Asia and for China. These included the increased possibility of 
American preventive military action to destroy North Korea's nuclear facilities, 
regime collapse and turmoil in a neighboring country, massive refugee outflows, 
Japanese involvement on the Korean peninsula, and the further strengthening 
ofU.S.-Japan-South Korea security relations. A nuclear North Korea could also 
complicate the U.S. focus of China's nuclear strategy. Beijing began to view the 
North Korean nuclear program as a serious security problem and became active 
in trying to defuse it by hosting the Six-Party Talks. Such involvement would 
also have diplomatic gains for China on several fronts and make it a key player in 
managing security in Asia. 
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Iran's nuclear quest has created apprehensions in Israel and certain Arab coun-
tries in the Middle East. A nuclear Iran is likely to intensify the Israel-Iran line of 
enmity and bring about change in Israel's nuclear posture, making nuclear weap-
ons more prominent in Middle East security. The animosity between Iran and the 
Arab states may also intensify, while that between Israel and the Arab states could 
become tempered. 
Among the major powers, nuclear weapons have created apprehensions but not 
fundamentally altered the basis and nature of their security interaction, which is 
characterized by cooperation and conflict. The vastly superior American nuclear 
arsenal, and especially Washi!fgton's emphasis on offensive and defensive strate-
gies, have raised concerns in Beijing and Moscow. Talk of U.S. nuclear primacy 
with a disarming capability created disquiet in these countries. The United States 
clarified that its offensive and defensive strategies are specifically directed at rogue 
states, and there is increasing doubt that the United States could develop effective 
strategic defense capabilities against China and Russia. Nevertheless, these coun-
tries can be expected to strengthen their strategic deterrent forces and increase 
their policy options in relation to the United States. At the same time, China 
has not abandoned its minimum deterrence strategy to engage in direct nuclear 
competition with the United States. The Chinese response has been deliberately 
indirect and muted. By retaining a posture of dynamic minimum deterrence and 
an NFU policy while continuing to modernize its nuclear force, China seeks 
to prevent deterioration of its security relations with the United States. In the 
case of Russia, its strong opposition to the U.S. ballistic missile defense deploy-
ment in Eastern Europe and its suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty further strained U.S.-Russia relations. However, Russia has not articulated 
a nuclear strategy to directly challenge or compete with the United States. The 
United States also does not appear to have altered its view of not treating Russia 
as an enemy state. 
Nuclear weapons have not substantially altered Sino-Indian security inter-
action, which appears to be proceeding on dual tracks: engagement and coop-
eration along with mutual suspicion and quiet competition. Although China 
condemned the Indian nuclear tests, and India is concerned about the strategic 
imbalance, neither country has emphasized nuclear weapons in their relationship. 
India seeks to build a robust deterrent against China, but it has not pursued this 
goal with urgency. China too has deemphasized its nuclear force in relation to 
India. The low-key general deterrence postures of both countries reflect their 
common desire to improve bilateral relations. 
Evidence from Asia supports the general proposition that arms per se do not 
create insecurity, but strategies for their employment may intensify or ameliorate 
insecurity. And nuclear weapons may modify but do not fundamentally alter the 
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pattern of security interaction. The modifying effect of nuclear weapons on sys-
tem structure is evident in alliances and alignments in the Asian security region. 
Mixed and Complicating Effect on Alliance& 
and Alignments 
Alliance formation and sustenance is a function of threat perception and bal-
ance of military capabilities (Walt 1987). The greater potential of nuclear weapons 
for internal balancing may reduce the need for a small nuclear weapon state to 
engage in external balancing by allying with a larger nuclear weapon state, but 
alliances among them can still be forged or sustained on other strategic consider-
ations. A small nuclear weapon state lacking a secure second-strike capability and, 
fearing nuclear attack by a stronger adversary, for example, may choose to align 
or ally with a larger nuclear weapon state. Alignment or alliance among nuclear 
weapon states may also rest on other benefits (such as status, diplomatic and eco-
~omic gains, and technological transfer). Perceiving a nuclear threat and lacking 
Its own capability, a nonnuclear weapon state may choose to ally with a nuclear 
weapon state that can extend the deterrence function of its nuclear arsenal. The 
alliance relationship of a nonnuclear or small nuclear weapon state with a larger 
~ne confr~nts two problems. One is fear of entrapment; the danger of becoming 
mvolved m the patron's broader security commitments that may have negative 
consequences for it. The larger nuclear weapon state also fears entrapment, as its 
junior partner could draw it into an undesired confrontation with another nuclear 
weapon state. The second problem-fear of abandonment-is more applicable to a 
~lient or junior partner state in an alliance relationship. The fear is that its security 
mterests may be sacrificed in the national interest of the larger state, especially if 
that state is vulnerable to retaliatory nuclear attack. In sum, nuclear weapons can 
strengthen and weaken alliances and make their management more complicated. 
All these effects of nuclear weapons on alliances are visible in Asia. 
As observed in Chapter 17, states perceiving existential threats view nuclear 
weapons as the ultimate security guarantee. In a worst-case scenario, they can 
rely on their own nuclear deterrent without the fear of abandonment. Nuclear 
weapons have reduced the salience of external balancing for Israel, Pakistan, and 
North Korea. Nevertheless, Israel still values close strategic ties with the United 
States, and Pakistan with China. Israel derives considerable political, diplomatic, 
strategic, economic, and technological benefits (and incurs some costs) from its 
close ties with the United States. Its opaque nuclear status is in part due to an 
u~derstanding reached between Washington and Tel Aviv (Cohen, Chapter 8 of 
this volume). Pakistan's nuclear weapon capability has not significantly affected 
its strategic alignment with China, which is grounded in their common concern 
over India. Islamabad still relies on China for political and diplomatic support, 
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assistance with nuclear and missile technology, and economic assistance (Khan 
and Lavoy, Chapter 7 of this volume). For China, Pakistan is still valuable in con-
straining rising India's power and influence in and beyond South Asia. Pakistan's 
strategic independence also permits China to adopt a more neutral position on is-
sues such as the Kashmir conflict and improve relations with India without under-
mining those with Pakistan. 
North Korea has no military ally. Beijing's commitment to the security of 
North Korea has been reduced significantly in the context of China's modern-
ization drive, dramatic improvement in the PRC and the Republic of Korea's 
(ROK) relations, and the poli.tical transition in North Korea. The growing con-
ception in China of North Korea as a security problem has weakened Beijing's 
support for the KimJong 11 regime. However, China does not wish collapse of the 
North Korean regime and opposes preventive military action against North Ko-
rea. Pyongyang's security ties with the Soviet Union terminated with the collapse 
and fragmentation of that country. Russia provides only conditional diplomatic 
support. Termination of the alliances with China and Russia, its weakening eco-
nomic and military position, and diplomatic isolation spurred the imperative for 
North Korea's self-reliant deterrent capability. 
Other nonnuclear weapon states like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Tai-
wan that perceive military threats from nuclear armed adversaries have taken a 
different route: sustaining and strengthening their alliance relationships with the 
United States. As discussed in Chapter 17, North Korea's nuclear weapon and mis-
sile programs and China's modernization of its nuclear arsenal are perceived in 
Japan as increasing its strategic vulnerability. Rather than seek an independent 
nuclear weapon capability or reduce the salience of the U.S.-Japan security alli-
ance, the nuclear concern provides an additional incentive for deeper security ties 
between Japan and the United States (see Green and Furukawa, Chapter 12 of 
this volume). Tokyo is seeking mechanisms for nuclear dialogue with Washing-
ton and for input into U.S. nuclear policy toward Asia to increase the credibility 
of the American extended deterrence commitment. There is concern that the 
U.S. may enter into understandings or agreements with China and North Korea 
that do not take full account of Japan's interests. A fear of abandonment lurks in 
the background and could become stronger, especially if the United States be-
comes vulnerable to a nuclear strike by North Korea. For now the emphasis is on 
strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Tokyo also seeks to enhance strategic rela-
tions with other like-minded countries, such as Australia and India. 
The North Korean nuclear test also resurrected interest in South Korea to 
reaffirm the American extended deterrence commitment under the U.S.-ROK 
security treaty. Through much of its post-World War II history, Seoul was wor-
ried about abandonment and the need to fnmly bind the United States to South 
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Korea's security (Choi and Park, Chapter 13 of this volume). Since the early 1990s, 
however, South Korea has been deeply conflicted over its security alliance with 
the United States. This was reflected in the security policies of the progressive ad-
ministrations of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun. Seoul was worried about be-
coming entrapped in an American preventive military action against North Korea 
and becoming involved in U.S. global security commitments like that in Iraq. The 
North Korean nuclear test helped heighten the importance of the U.S. security 
commitment. And the incoming conservative Lee Myung Bak administration is 
committed to improving South Korea's ties with the United States and transform-
ing the U.S.-South Korea military alliance into a "Korea-U.S. Strategic Alliance" 
based on three core principles of "common values, trust, and peace" (Lee 2008). 
Differences in threat perception, competing goals and interests, a.nd future burden 
and responsibility sharing, along with change in the nature of threats, are likely 
to complicate future management of U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea. 
However, the alliances themselves are likely to continue. 
The entry of new, "irresponsible" nuclear powers (Pakistan and North Korea) 
and the changed security environment have raised questions about the earlier Aus-
tralian rationale for supporting the U.S. nuclear umbrella and Australia's security 
alliance with the United States (Lyon, Chapter 15 of this volume). However, this 
largely intellectual doubt does not appear to have affected the U.S.-Australia alli-
ance, which deepened in the wake of 9/n and under the John Howard administra-
tion. The new Kevin Rudd government seeks closer ties with China and may be 
less enthusiastic about contributing to U.S. global military ventures, but it is un-
likely to substantively alter the close security relationship with the United States. 
The fear of abandonment and entrapment are most visible in the Taiwan-U.S. 
security relationship. The United States is the only and vital secarity guarantor for 
Taiwan. However, the U.S. commitment is deliberately ambiguous, implicit, and 
designed to deter China as well as Taiwan. Taiwan cannot take the U.S. commit-
ment for granted (Wang, Chapter 14 of this volume). Fearing abandonment, it has 
to continuously work to retain U.S. support. For its part, the United States fears 
entrapment-being drawn into a war situation not of its choosing. Although the 
United States seeks to deter China, it does not want a major war with that country, 
especially one that could escalate to the nuclear level. Management of the U.S. 
commitment to the security ofTaiwan has become more complicated with the rise 
of China; the modernization of its nuclear, missile, and naval forces; and the need 
for the United States to cooperate with that country on a wide range of issues. 
Not a Barrier to Peaceful Conflict Resolution 
The three key conflicts in Asia (on the Korean peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, 
and over Kashmir) cannot be settled by force without huge costs. By dramatically 
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increasing the speed and scale of destruction that can occur from their use, nuclear 
weapons have made the barrier to settlement by force prohibitive. In this sense, it 
is possible to argue that they have helped freeze conflicts. However, nuclear weap-
ons are not a barrier to peaceful settlement. In fact, the impossibility of military 
victory and the grave risks associated with nuclear war may have led states to alter 
their immediate goals and explore a diplomatic settlement. 
Nuclear weapons constrain Chinese use of force to alter the status quo and 
achieve its unification goaL Recognizing the risks associated with military action 
(including possible escalation to nuclear war), the unlikely prospect that the Taiwan 
conflict will be resolved peacef]llly to its satisfaction in the foreseeable future, and a 
belief that the present trend in cross-Strait relations is in its favor, China has in re-
cent years begun to shift its emphasis from unification to preventing Taiwan inde-
pendence and preserving the status quo. On the Korean peninsula, recognizing the 
limits and risks of attempting an offensive strategy, the United States altered course 
to seek a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear problem and other disputes there. In 
India-Pakistan relations as well, the grave risks associated with the military stand-
off between the two countries have forced them to explore negotiated settlement 
of the multiple disputes, including the status and control of Kashmir. 
It should be observed here that multiple factors account for the shift in objec-
tive (in the Taiwan conflict) and the decisions to enter into dialogue and negotiate 
diplomatic settlements (of the North Korea and Kashmir conflicts). Limits and 
risks associated with nuclear weapons are one inducement. Ultimately, the peace-
ful settlement of these conflicts will hinge on working out ·compromise agree-
ments. Such compromises become more (or less) possible with domestic political 
change. Recent government change in Taiwan and Pakistan has created a positive 
atmosphere for reducing tension and negotiating bilateral agreements to establish 
stable and peaceful relations in hitherto tension-ridden dyads. The incoming Ma 
Ying-jeou administration in Taiwan does not push the independence agenda, de-
sires better relations with China, and is viewed favorably by Beijing. Although the 
unification issue is unlikely to be resolved soon, the favorable developments are 
likely to enhance cross-Strait relations and increase Taiwan's security and inter-
national space. Likewise, the swing to democratic government in Pakistan may 
augur well for continuation of the India-Pakistan comprehensive dialogue and 
movement toward a negotiated settlement. But the presence of spoilers may make 
even an interim arrangement difficult. In South Korea, change in government 
may set back North-South relations. Although he favors continued engagement of 
North Korea, Lee Myung Bak would like to see greater progress on the nuclear 
issue and greater reciprocity in North-South relations. 
It is pertinent to observe here that nuclear weapons may have helped freeze the 
Cold War confrontation, but they did not prevent its termination. That confron-
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tation came to an end with change in government in the former USSR. Gorba-
chev's accession to the top position in the Soviet Communist Party and his reform 
policies were crucial in ending the Cold War and in the eventual dissolution of 
the USSR. Although China was not locked into a nuclear confrontation, the tran-
sition from Mao Tse Tung to Deng Xiao Ping and the latter's open-door policy 
and modernization program were crucial in changing China's international ori-
entation. The general point is that resolution of disputes hinges on willingness to 
make deep political compromise; this can only come about through fundamental 
change in policy, which in turn becomes possible with idea-driven change in gov-
ernment. Nuclear weapons are instruments of policy and need not he a barrier to 
settlement of political disputes. 
Forging a New Nuclear Order 
The Cold War nuclear order emerged in the context of the largely Eurocen-
tric Soviet-American confrontation. Although Israel had a serious covert nuclear 
weapon program and India had conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, 
China was the only non-Western country acknowledged as a nuclear weapon state. 
The nuclear arsenals of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and 
China were considered legitimate.4 That nuclear order was founded on the twin 
concerns of sustaining deterrence between the two superpowers and preventing 
additional proliferation (Walker 2007). The primary concern was the deterrence 
strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union and their implications for in-
ternational security and stability. Arms control measures were designed to prevent 
the unintended outbreak and escalation of hostilities between them, to manage 
crisis, and to advance stability in their strategic interaction. There was less worry 
over the security strategies of the second-tier nuclear weapon states and their im-
plications. The primary effect of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that formed 
the second pillar of the Cold War nuclear order was to legitimize the discrimina-
tion embodied in that Treaty and to prevent additional proliferation by denying 
material and technology to new aspirants, imposing sanctions on them, and de-
legitimating new nuclear weapon states. It served the strategic interests of the five 
nuclear weapon states and ranked below the demands of their national security. 
Asia was a sideshow in that order. Policies, strategies, and agreements reached 
in a Eurocentric context were imposed on Asia. The implications for Asia were 
often an afterthought. The Cold War order is out of sync with present realties; 
some assert that it is broken and that a "new" nuclear order has to be constructed 
(Roberts 2007). A new nuclear order must center on the Asian security region, 
which has six nuclear weapon states (six including Israel; seven if North Korea is 
included) and which has become a core world region with potential to emerge as 
the central region of the world in the twenty-first century. As the findings of this 
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study highlight, the nuclear situation in Asia today is dramatically different from 
that in the Cold War era. Deterrence is still the dominant strategy for employing 
nuclear weapons, but it operates in a condition of asymmetry and mostly with 
small nuclear forces. Nuclear weapons have far-reaching implications, but they are 
not in the forefront as they were in the Cold War confrontation. 
Elements of a New Nuclear Order 
A new order should take account of the changed strategic realities; the central-
ity of Asia; and the "new" roles, strategies, and outcomes of nuclear weapons, and 
not simply seek to continue to impose treaties and regimes that were negotiated 
in a different context. Further, it must be flexible enough to accommodate new 
nuclear powers. In an earlier period, the nuclear order did accommodate the new 
nuclear weapon states of the Soviet Union, China, Britain, and France. The at-
tempt to freeze that order resulted in several undeclared nuclear weapon states 
outside the system. The effort in 1995 to close loopholes and permanently freeze 
the discriminatory nonproliferation regime compelled India, followed by Paki-
stan, to openly declare their nuclear weapon status. In addition, fear of U.S. mili-
tary action accelerated the nuclear program of North Korea and that of Iran. The 
new nuclear order must address five issues: It must (1) sustain deterrence in new 
conditions and discourage offensive roles and strategies, (2) be capable of accom-
modating new nuclear weapon states, (3) address the security concerns of potential 
candidates to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons, (4) prevent proliferation 
to nonstate actors, and (5) support the peaceful use of nuclear energy with ad-
equate safeguards. 
Sustain Deterrence in New Conditions and Discourage Offensive Strategies. As discus-
sion in Chapter 17 highlighted, deterrence continues to be the dominant strategy 
for employment of nuclear weapons, but it now operates primarily in a condition 
of asymmetry with mostly small nuclear forces. The nuclear order must support 
measures to strengthen deterrence stability in the new condition and discourage 
capabilities and strategies that can undermine security and stability. 
Accommodate New Nuclear Weapon States. The nuclear order in the 1950s and 196os 
did accommodate change by bringing on board new nuclear weapon states. The 
U.S.-India nuclear deal must be seen in this light. It is an attempt to bring a rising 
India into the nuclear order with due consideration of its strategic interests and of 
nonproliferation concerns. This effort cannot be viewed solely or even primarily 
through the nonproliferation lens. A rigid nonproliferation stance would gradu-
ally widen the gap between the formal nuclear order and reality and over time 
make the formal order largely irrelevant. In due course, country-spedfic arrange-
ments would have to be worked out for Pakistan and Israel as well. An incremen-
tal approach that accommodates change with emphasis on responsible behavior 
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would create a more stable and inclusive nuclear order that can strengthen security 
and stability. 
Slow the Spread by Addressing Demand and Supply. A continuing thrust of the new 
nuclear order must be to slow the further spread of nuclear weapons by addressing 
the security concerns of potential nuclear weapon states. One may question why 
this is an important concern in light of the conclusion of this study that nuclear 
weapons have thus far contributed to security and stability. My response is as fol-
lows. I am not arguing that more is better and that any state that wants nuclear 
weapons should be able to get them. My argument is that nuclear weapons have 
contributed to security and stability in the Asian security region. The "new" nu-
clear weapon states (India, Israel, and Pakistan) acquired the capability over a pro-
longed period. All three countries believed that nuclear weapons were essential for 
their security. India and Pakistan were denied technologies, faced sanctions during 
the covert and overt periods, and incurred high costs in persevering with their 
quests. Similarly, North Korea and Iran are now confronting sanctions and tech-
nology denials. Their nuclear weapon programs may or may not move forward. My 
point is that if a country strongly believes it needs nuclear weapons for its security, 
it will persist in that quest and ultimately succeed. At that point the international 
community has little choice but to accept that country as a nuclear weapon state. 
The prolonged acquisition period permits adjustments among relevant states. Thus 
it is still necessary to be concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons to limit it 
to those countries that consider them vital, are willing to incur high costs, over-
come international opposition, and are capable of producing their own weapons 
and missiles. In the process, the international community should make a serious 
effort to address the security concerns of such countries (the demand side of the 
proliferation equation) to obviate the need for these "ultimate" weapons. 
In this regard, the U.S. security alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Austra-
lia, and its extended deterrence commitments to them, are important in assuaging 
their security concerns and preventing their pursuit of independent nuclear op-
tions. To make its security guarantee even more credible, the United States may 
have to explore country-specific arrangements. China's continued deemphasis on 
nuclear weapons in its relations with Japan would also help prevent Japanese pur-
suit of the nuclear option. In relation to North Korea and Iran, the United States 
is a prime driver of their quest for nuclear weapons. Washington considers them 
"bad guys." This they may be, but not addressing their security concerns drives 
them into a corner from which they see nuclear .weapons as their savior. With the 
failure of its earlier policy, the Bush administration switched to a diplomatic ap-
proach that addresses the political, security, and economic concerns ofNorth Ko-
rea in an arrangement that would progressively dismantle that country's nuclear 
weapon capability. 
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It is premature to draw any firm conclusions from the North Korean case. 
Progress has been limited and episodic and could take several years, and success is 
not guaranteed. But a diplomatic approach that addresses the security concerns of 
the state pursuing a nuclear weapon capability is likely to be more productive than 
an approach that stresses isolation, denial, and sanctions. Carrot and stick must go 
together. Despite the ongoing effort, the international community may have to 
accept and come to terms with a nuclear North Korea. A determined state can-
not be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapon capability. However, the process 
can be made onerous and costly. Military action that brings about regime change 
may "permanently" stop the pr9gram, but regime change may lead to even worse 
problems. Iraq is a classic recent example. Nonproliferation is not the only objec-
tive. National and regional security and stability are as important if not more 
important. These objectives and national self-interest appear to drive the Chinese 
approach to the North Korean nuclear problem. The nuclear nonproliferation re-
gime, if it is to remain relevant, must address both demand and supply. It must also 
accommodate gray zones rather than insist on black-and-white outcomes. 
Prevent the Spread to Nonstate Actors. Another thrust of a new nuclear order must 
be to prevent the spread of nuclear material, technology, and weapons to non-
state groups and organizations. Nuclear weapons in the hands of nonstate ac-
tors threaten both specific states and the entire international system. Countries 
that provide sanctuary to terrorist groups should be legitimate targets for military 
action by aggrieved states and the international community. The international 
community has taken several measures to prevent the spread of nuclear material, 
technology, and weapons to nonstate actors. Based on a 2002 report by the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 2002), several international instruments 
have been adopted. These include the Code for Conduct for the Safety and Secu-
rity of Radioactive Sources and the U.N. General Assembly's International Con-
vention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism adopted in 2005 (IAEA 
2005). The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 adopted in 2004 calls on states 
to strengthen their nuclear safeguards and prohibits them from transferring nuclear 
capabilities to potentially dangerous nonstate actors. In addition, U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1373 adopted in 2001 called on states to become parties to in-
ternational conventions relating to terrorism. The United States has also initiated -
several measures, including the Proliferation Security Initiative. The challenge 
now is to bring more states on board and to implement the various conventions 
and initiatives. Preventing nuclear terrorism requires sustained vigilance, the de-
velopment of additional countermeasures, and effective implementation. 
Facilitate Development cif Nuclear Energy with Adequate Siifeguards. The final thrust 
of the "new" nuclear order should facilitate peaceful use of nuclear power to meet 
rising energy demand, with adequate safeguards to prevent noneconomic use. 
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The high price and polluting effects of fossil fuels, as well as tne concern that 
known reserves may be inadequate to meet the growing energy demand, have 
generated much interest in nuclear energy. To meet the growing demand, inter-
national governance will be required to support investment and trade in nuclear 
energy and to institute sufficient controls to prevent the spread of nuclear weapon 
capability (Sokolski 2007). 
The five issues discussed above that have to be addressed by a new nuclear 
order are not necessarily complementary. Competing demands are likely to make 
the forging of a new nuclear order more difficult. Grand schemes will be difficult 
to design, gain acceptance, and implement. Piecemeal and ad hoc.measures are 
more likely. Although some aspects may still be relevant, any effort to freeze or 
restore the Cold War nuclear order wholesale is likely to fail. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Asia and the world are entering new strategic and nuclear environments that 
are dramatically different from those of the Cold War. Though not in the fore-
front as in the Cold War confrontation, this study has argued that nuclear weapons 
continue to be important. They cast a long shadow that informs in fundamental 
ways the strategic thinking, policies, strategies, and interaction of major powers 
and their key allies. Modernizing their arsenals and building new capabilities, 
old and new nuclear weapon states envisage new roles and strategies for nuclear 
weapons in the context of the security challenges they confront. Some states view 
nuclear weapons as crucial for survival; others see them as a relatively inexpensive 
way of competing with and deterring stronger adversaries; some see them as in-
surance to avoid blackmail and cope with strategic uncertainty; and as the world's 
sole superpower, the United States seeks to employ nuclear weapons and construct 
a nuclear regime to sustain a U.S.-led global order. 
A major conclusion of this study is that deterrence dominance is likely to con-
tinue, and deterrence is likely to be the primary role and strategy for the employ-
ment of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. However, deterrence today 
functions in a condition of asymmetry and mostly with small nuclear forces. It 
is further complicated by the development of offensive capabilities and strategic 
defense. Another important conclusion is that thus far nuclear weapons have con-
tributed to peace and stability in the Asian security region by assuaging national 
security concerns and reinforcing the circumscription trend in tne region on the 
role of force. Although destabilizing consequences can be imagined, these have 
been rare and confined to early stages in the acquisition and operationalization of 
capabilities and strategies. By highlighting the risks and dangers associated with 
certain roles and strategies, crisis situations have contributed to a more sober as-
sessment of the roles and limitations of nuclear weapons. 
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These and other observations advanced in this study run counter to some con-
clusions reached during the Cold War and differ from prevailing conventional 
wisdoms. It is crucial to reexamine and refine "old" ideas, concepts, and strate-
gies as well as develop "new" ones relevant to the contemporary nuclear era. This 
study has identified some baseline national nuclear roles and strategies and explored 
their regional security implications. The propositions advanced here, however, 
require further development, refinement, and even reformulation. The meaning, 
content, and operationalization of the various strategies of deterrence, including 
the required force levels, for example, require detailed inquiry. How to advance 
deterrence stability in a condition of asymmetry and small nuclear forces is another 
important issue to explore. Ensuring the effectiveness and credibility of extended 
deterrence is another. Having developed a comparative understanding of the roles 
of nuclear weapons in national security strategies of relevant states and their re-
gional security implications, it is now opportune and necessary to embark on 
more in-depth work on these issues. Such work must be grounded in the changing 
political and strategic conditions in Asia and accord due consideration to develop-
ments in defense science and technology. It is also important to develop a knowl-
edge community on the subject, especially in Asia, and to foster cross-country 
and regional dialogues to develop a common discourse and understanding. My 
hope is that this study provides a foundation for these and other undertakings on 
the subject of nuclear weapons and security in twenty-first-century Asia. 
Notes 
I. For contending explanations of the long peace, see Kegley (1991). 
2. Many Western leaders made statements to this effect after the Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear tests in 1998. See, for example, Clinton (1998). 
3. William Perry, a former defense secretary who handled the 1993-94 nuclear crisis 
on the Korean peninsula, recommended a military strike to stop the North Korean test of 
a long-range missile. See Carter and Perry (2006). 
4. Mohamed ElBaradei (2006: A23) states that "under the NPT there is no such thing 
as a 'legitimate' or 'illegitimate' nuclear weapon state." The recogmtion of five states as 
holders of nuclear weapons was regarded as a matter of transition. The NPT does not con-
fer permanent nuclear weapon status on the five countries. 
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